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REMAND AND APPELLATE REVIEW ISSUES 
FACING THE SUPREME COURT IN CARLSBAD 
TECHNOLOGY, INC. V. HIF BIO, INC. 
Deborah J. Challener* & John B. Howell, III** 
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and (d), remand orders in removed cases 
are immune from appellate review when they are based on a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.1  Until recently, all appellate courts that had addressed 
the issue had concluded that when a district court declines to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)2 and remands the supple-
mental claims to state court, the remand is not based on a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and is therefore reviewable on appeal.3  In HIF Bio, Inc. 
v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,4 however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit became the first circuit to hold that 
such remands, sometimes referred to as Cohill remands,5 are based on a ju-
risdictional defect and therefore are not subject to appellate review.6  On 





  Associate Professor, Mississippi College School of Law; B.A., Oberlin College, 1990; M.P.P., 
Vanderbilt University, 1995; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 1998.  A full-length version 
of this Essay will appear in Volume 81, Issue 4 of the Temple Law Review.  
**
  Law Clerk, the Honorable Daniel A. Manion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
2008–10; Law Clerk, the Honorable David C. Bramlette, III, U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Mississippi, 2007–08; J.D., Mississippi College School of Law, 2007.  
1
  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–(d) (2006) (link). 
2
  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (link). 
3
  See, e.g., Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 221–25 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing pre-
cedents from several circuits) (link).  
4
  508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (link), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 395 (2008) (link).  
5
  A remand that occurs after a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 
1367(c) is sometimes referred to as a ―Cohill remand‖ because the Supreme Court held in Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill that district courts could remand pendent claims in removed cases instead of 
dismissing them.  484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988) (link).  At the time the Court decided Cohill, there was no 
statutory basis for the remand of pendent claims.  Instead, the power to remand derived from the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction.  Id. at 356.  When the supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted, it did 
not (and still does not) provide for the remand or dismissal of supplemental claims once a district court 
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).  Because the district 
court‘s remand authority does not derive from § 1367, it (presumably) continues to derive from Cohill.  
Thus, this Essay refers to the remand of claims after a district court declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction as a ―Cohill remand.‖ 
6
  See HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
103:418  (2009) Remand and Appellate Review Issues 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/14/ 419 
solve the circuit split created by the Federal Circuit.7  The Court heard oral 
argument in the case, now captioned Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, 
Inc., on February 24, 2009.   
This Essay provides a brief explanation of § 1367 and §§ 1447(c) and 
(d) and argues that the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit‘s 
decision in HIF Bio.  We contend that the Federal Circuit erred in conclud-
ing that Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional because a district 
court does not remand supplemental claims based on its lack of power over 
the claims.  Instead, a district court remands supplemental claims based on 
its discretionary decision under § 1367(c) that a state court is a better forum 
in which to litigate them.  After establishing that Cohill remands are not 
subject-matter jurisdictional and therefore are reviewable on appeal, we ex-
amine the district court‘s remand order and the Federal Circuit‘s opinion in 
HIF Bio.  We assert that in reviewing the remand order in HIF Bio and de-
ciding that Cohill remands fall within §§ 1447(c) and (d), the Federal Cir-
cuit incorrectly applied the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Powerex 
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.8  Finally, we offer a few comments 
about whether Cohill remands should be reviewable on appeal. 
I. BACKGROUND      
A. Section 1367 
28 U.S.C. § 1367,9 the supplemental jurisdiction statute, codifies the 
common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.10  Section 
1367(a) states that when a federal court has ―original jurisdiction‖ over at 
least one claim in an action, it ―shall have‖ supplemental jurisdiction over 
additional claims that are part of the same Article III case or controversy 
but do not by themselves fall within the court‘s original jurisdiction.11  The 
Supreme Court has said that supplemental jurisdiction ―‗is a doctrine of dis-
cretion, not of plaintiff‘s right,‘‖12 and § 1367(c) ―confirms [its] discretio-
nary nature . . . by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts 





  Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (mem.) (link).   
8
  127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007) (link). 
9
  28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).   
10
  City of Chicago v. Int‘l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997) (link). 
11
  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 
(2005) (link); see also Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 167 (―The whole point of supplemental juris-
diction is to allow the district courts to exercise . . . jurisdiction over claims as to which original jurisdic-
tion is lacking.‖). 
12
  Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 
715, 726 (1966) (link)). 
13
  Id. at 173. 
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court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 
subsection (a)‖ where: 
 
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the 
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over 
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district 
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdic-
tion, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compel-
ling reasons for declining jurisdiction.14 
 
According to the Supreme Court, § 1367(c) ―reflects the understanding 
that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‗a feder-
al court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the 
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comi-
ty.‘‖15   
B. Section 1447 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) identifies two grounds for the remand of cases that 
are removed from state to federal court.  First, a plaintiff can move in feder-
al court to remand a case on the basis of a defect in removal procedure as 
long as the remand motion is filed ―within 30 days after . . . removal.‖16  
Second, a district court must remand the case ―[i]f at any time before final 
judgment it appears that the . . . court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.‖17  
Federal courts are not limited to remanding cases based on the grounds 
listed in § 1447(c).  They can also remand cases based on, for example, ab-
stention18 or a forum selection clause.19  Federal courts, however, are not 
permitted to remand cases or claims on grounds that they have ―no authori-





  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006); see also Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (―Depending on a 
host of factors, then—including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law 
claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal 
claims—district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.‖). 
15
  Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 
350 (1988)). 
16
  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).  Section 1447(c) states: ―A motion to remand on the basis of any de-
fect other than the lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after . . . removal.‖  
Id. (emphasis added).  Federal appellate courts have interpreted this portion of § 1447(c) to apply only to 
defects in removal procedure.  See, e.g., Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R. v. Ericsson Inc., 201 
F.3d 15, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2000) (link); Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1252–60 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(link); Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1998) (link).  
17
  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  
18
  See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716–19 (1996) (link). 
19
  Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R., 201 F.3d at 16–17; Snapper, Inc., 171 F.3d at 1252–60. 
20
  Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351–52 (1976) (link), overruled in part 
by Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714–15. 
21
  Id. at 344. 
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Section 1447(d) provides that remand orders are ―not reviewable on 
appeal or otherwise‖ except in civil rights cases.22  According to the Su-
preme Court, the purpose of § 1447(d)‘s review bar is to prevent the delay 
caused by ―protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.‖23  Although the 
plain language of § 1447(d) appears to implicate all remand orders regard-
less of whether they are made pursuant to § 1447(c), the Supreme Court re-
jected such an interpretation of the statute in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. 
Hermansdorfer.24  The Thermtron Court held that §§ 1447(c) and (d) ―must 
be construed together,‖25 and therefore ―only remand orders issued under § 
1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein . . . are immune from 
review under § 1447(d).‖26  Thus, under Thermtron, only remands based on 
a defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction fall 
within § 1447(d)‘s review bar.  Other types of remands, such as those based 
on abstention27 or a forum selection clause,28 remain reviewable on appeal.  
Since Thermtron, the Court has stated repeatedly that only § 1447(c) re-
mands are immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).29   
II. POWER VERSUS DISCRETION: WHY COHILL REMANDS ARE NOT 
BASED ON A LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE 
ARE REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL  
This Part argues that there is a crucial distinction between the existence 
of judicial power—i.e., subject matter jurisdiction—and the exercise of that 
power.  The existence of judicial power is a yes-or-no question.  The deci-
sion whether to exercise that power, on the other hand, is discretionary if 





  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).  See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006) (link). 
23
  Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 351; see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007) (stating that the policy behind § 1447(d) is ―avoiding prolonged litigation 
on threshold nonmerits questions‖). 
24
  423 U.S. 336.   
25
  Id. at 345. 
26
  Id. at 346.  The Court further held that a § 1447(c) remand order is immune from appellate review 
regardless of ―whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court.‖  Id. at 351; 
see also Gravitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1977) (per curiam) (―The District Court‘s 
remand order was plainly within the bounds of § 1447(c) and hence was unreviewable by the Court of 
Appeals, by mandamus or otherwise.‖) (link).  
27
  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1996). 
28
  Autoridad de Energia Electrica de P.R. v. Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1252–60 (11th Cir. 1999). 
29
  Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2007) (assuming ―that 
the prohibition on appellate review remains limited to remands [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and for defects in removal procedure]‖ under § 1447(c)); Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881, 893 (2007) 
(link); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2152–54 (2006) (link); Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 
at 711–12; Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995) (link).   
30
  Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 923, 962 (1988) (discussing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), and explaining that 
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claims, it does not do so because it lacks power to adjudicate them.  A dis-
trict court remands supplemental claims because it has made a discretionary 
decision not to exercise existing judicial power.  Thus, Cohill remands are 
not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore are reviewa-
ble on appeal. 
A. Judicial Power 
―[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction‖ is a court‘s ―statutory or constitutional 
power to adjudicate [a] case.‖31  It is axiomatic that a federal district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim only when both the U.S. Consti-
tution and a federal statute provide the court with power to adjudicate the 
claim.  For example, a claim falls within the federal question jurisdiction of 
a federal court only when both Article III of the Constitution and § 1331 au-
thorize the court to adjudicate the claim.  Similarly, a claim falls within the 
supplemental jurisdiction of a federal court only when both Article III and § 
1367(a) authorize adjudication.32  When a civil action is filed in or removed 
to federal court, the constitutional and statutory requirements for subject 
matter jurisdiction either are satisfied or they are not, and judicial power ei-
ther exists or it does not.  
B. The Discretionary Decision Whether to Exercise Judicial Power: 
Abstention and Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Generally, when the jurisdiction of a federal court is properly invoked, 
the court has a ―strict duty‖ to adjudicate the controversy.33  This duty de-
rives from the ―undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not 
the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitu-
tionally permissible bounds.‖34  Nevertheless, the federal courts‘ obligation 
to decide cases is not ―absolute.‖35  The Supreme Court has long held that 
                                                                                                                           
the ―existence of judicial power‖ is a ―‗yes or no‘ question as to whether jurisdiction exists,‖ whereas 
―the exercise of that power‖ is ―merely a matter of discretion‖); see also Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 
546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction ―poses a ‗whether,‘ not a ‗where‘ ques-
tion: Has the Legislature empowered the court to hear cases of a certain genre?‖) (link); Kircher v. Put-
nam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.) (stating that it is 
important to ―distinguish between a decision that ‗[a] court lacks adjudicatory competence‘ and a deci-
sion that ‗[a] court has been authorized to do X and having done so should bow out‘‖ because ―[t]he 
former implies lack of subject-matter jurisdiction‖ whereas ―the latter implies the presence of jurisdic-
tion‖) (link), rev’d on other grounds by 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).   
31
  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (link); see also Powerex Corp., 
127 S. Ct. at 2418 (emphasis in original) (stating that ―subject-matter jurisdiction‖ is the ―power to adju-
dicate . . . claims‖). 
32
  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006) (―Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action 
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 . . . is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed . . . .‖) (link). 
33
  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. 
34
  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (link). 
35
  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. 
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federal courts may abstain in certain cases.36  Under the abstention doc-
trines, federal courts ―may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in other-
wise exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum would 
clearly serve an important countervailing interest.‖37  The Supreme Court 
has ―located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by fed-
eral courts sitting in equity.‖38  Furthermore, the Court has held that absten-
tion-based remands are reviewable on appeal because they are not based on 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus are not subject to §§ 1447(c) 
and (d).39 
Similarly, the decision whether to exercise the supplemental jurisdic-
tion that exists under § 1367(a) is discretionary once a court has determined 
that § 1367(c) is satisfied. Section 1367(a) states: ―Except as provided in 
subsections (b) and (c) or as otherwise expressly provided by Federal sta-
tute,‖ the district courts ―shall have supplemental jurisdiction‖ when the 
statute is properly invoked.  The mandatory language in § 1367(a)—―shall 
have supplemental jurisdiction‖—indicates that the court has a duty to ad-
judicate the supplemental claims before it.  Section 1367(a) makes it clear, 
however, that the court‘s duty is not absolute.40  Subsection (b) provides that 
in diversity cases, the district courts ―shall not have supplemental jurisdic-
tion under subsection (a)‖ over particular claims.  Thus, in certain cases 
subsection (b) specifically withdraws the jurisdiction granted under subsec-
tion (a).41 
In contrast, under subsection (c) a district court ―may decline to exer-





  See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814–17 
(1976) (discussing the different categories of abstention and citing many cases in which the Supreme 
Court has approved of abstention) (link). 
37
  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
38
  Id. at 718 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  In the past, it has 
been unclear whether, for example, ―Pullman abstention is mandatory or discretionary.‖  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 795 (5th ed. 2007).  In other words, it has been uncertain 
whether a court is obligated to abstain if the requirements for abstention are satisfied or whether a court 
can decide to exercise jurisdiction even if the requirements for abstention are satisfied.  According to 
Dean Chemerinsky, the ―preferable approach is to treat abstention as discretionary and allow federal 
courts to hear the case, even if the Pullman criteria are met, provided substantial reasons for avoiding 
abstention are present.‖  Id.  As noted above, the Court stated in Quackenbush, its most recent abstention 
decision, that abstention is ―derived from ‗discretion historically enjoyed by courts of equity.‘‖  517 
U.S. at 728; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943) (describing the court‘s choice of 
whether to abstain as a matter of discretion) (link).  Thus, the better conclusion is that the decision 
whether to abstain is a discretionary one.  
39
  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12. 
40
  See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision 
Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 938–39 (1998) (―Subsection 1367(a) begins with a sweeping grant 
of supplemental jurisdiction. . . .  The drafters elected to phrase this grant in mandatory language, sub-
ject only to the exceptions expressly provided by other federal statutes or set out in subsections (b) and 
(c) of section 1367.‖). 
41
  See id. at 940–43. 
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the criteria enumerated in subsection (c) is satisfied.42  Subsection (c), un-
like subsection (b), does not withdraw the jurisdiction granted in subsection 
(a).43  Instead, subsection (c) authorizes a district court to decline to exercise 
the power that it has under subsection (a) if subsection (c) is satisfied and 
the court chooses not to exercise its power.  The court may, but is not obli-
gated to, decline to exercise its supplemental power.44  Thus, the plain lan-
guage of subsection (c) demonstrates that it is not an express statutory 
exception to subsection (a).  Instead, when a court declines to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), as when it abstains, the court is 
making a discretionary decision not to exercise existing judicial power.45  
The court has both constitutional and statutory authority to adjudicate the 
claim but chooses not to use its power.   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said that § 1367(c) ―confirms the 
discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the cir-
cumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.‖46  The Court 
has also acknowledged that although ―the terms of § 1367(a) authorize the 
district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims,‖ 
that ―does not mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.‖47  
Thus, the Court has never suggested that the decision whether to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction is anything other than discretionary once § 
1367(c) is satisfied. 
Finally, jurisdiction does not evaporate at the moment a court declines 
to exercise its supplemental power.48  Once a court has determined that § 
1367(c) is applicable and that it will exercise its discretion not to adjudicate 
a supplemental claim, there is nothing left for the court to do except remand 





  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (emphasis added).  Section 1367(c) specifically provides that a court 
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when ―(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issues 
of State law,‖ (2) ―the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims‖ within the court‘s 
original jurisdiction, (3) ―the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdic-
tion,‖ or (4) ―in exceptional circumstances.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)–(4).  
43
  Oakley, supra note 40, at 943 (―[S]ubsection 1367(c) further qualifies the mandatory nature of . . 
. subsection (a),‖ but ―[u]nlike subsection 1367(b) . . . does not withdraw the jurisdiction granted by sub-
section 1367(a).  Subsection 1367(c) seeks instead to resurrect the element of judicial discretion in the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction that the mandatory phrasing of subsection 1367(a) needlessly ex-
tinguished.‖). 
44
  See City of Chicago v. Int‘l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (emphasis in original) 
(―Of course, to say that the terms of § 1367(a) authorize the district courts to exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction over state law claims . . . does not mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.‖). 
45
  David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section 1447(c), in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) 
(West 2006) (stating that the decision whether to remand a supplemental claim after the main claim has 
been disposed of on the merits is ―not a question of subject matter jurisdiction,‖ but ―[l]ike . . . absten-
tion . . . it‘s one of discretion‖). 
46
  Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). 
47
  Id. at 172 (emphasis in original). 
48
  This argument is derived from Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 849–50 (7th Cir. 
2004) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.), rev’d on other grounds by 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).   
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but instead from the court‘s decision not to exercise its existing judicial au-
thority.  Accordingly, remands under § 1367(c), like abstention-based re-
mands, are not subject-matter jurisdictional and therefore are reviewable on 
appeal.  
III. HIF BIO V. YUNG SHIN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIAL CO. 
A. The Remand Order and the Federal Circuit’s Opinion 
The plaintiffs in HIF Bio brought suit in a California state court to re-
solve a dispute over the rights to anti-cancer medical research.49  The defen-
dants removed the case to federal court.50  In their First Amended 
Complaint, the plaintiffs asserted a claim under the federal Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖) and several claims under 
state law.51  The district court dismissed the RICO claim and remanded the 
state claims.52  In its remand order, the court stated: ―[T]he Court declines to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. . . . The state 
claims clearly predominate over the federal RICO claim.  The preponder-
ance of state law issues means that a state court is the proper venue to try 
the state law claims.‖53  One of the defendants, Carlsbad Technology, Inc., 
then appealed. 
The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal be-
cause Cohill remands ―can be colorably characterized as [] remand[s] based 
on lack of subject matter jurisdiction‖ under § 1447(c) and therefore are 
―barred from appellate review under § 1447(d).‖54  The court reasoned that 
supplemental state law claims by definition lack an independent basis of ju-
risdiction and therefore a court has power over them only if they fall within 
§ 1367(a).55  According to the Federal Circuit, ―‗[t]he text of § 1367(a) indi-
cates [that] § 1367(c) constitutes an express statutory exception to the au-
thorization of jurisdiction granted by § 1367(a).‘‖56  Thus, ―when declining 
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, a district court strips the claims 





  HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharms. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 660–61 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (2008). 
50
  Id. at 661. 
51
  See HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharms. Indus. Co., No. CV 05-07976 DDP, 2006 WL 6086295, 
at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006). 
52
  See id. at *6. 
53
  Id. at *3. 
54
  HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
55
  See id. 
56
  Id. (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (link)). 
57
  Id. 
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Absent the ―cloak of supplemental jurisdiction, [the] state claims must be 
remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.‖58 
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the argument that Cohill 
remands are similar to abstention-based remands and therefore, like absten-
tion-based remands, are subject to appellate review.59  The Federal Circuit 
explained that when a court abstains, it declines to hear ―claims over which 
it has an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction.‖60  Thus, ―a re-
mand premised on abstention cannot be colorably characterized as a remand 
based on lack of jurisdiction . . . .‖61  According to the Federal Circuit, Co-
hill remands are distinguishable because the only basis for jurisdiction over 
supplemental claims is § 1367(a).62  Because the court believed that § 
1367(c) is an exception to § 1367(a), it reasoned that once a court declines 
to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, the state law claims no longer fall 
within § 1367(a) and therefore are without any jurisdictional basis.63  At that 
point, the Federal Circuit concluded, the district court must remand the state 
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and §§ 1447(c) and (d) bar 
appellate review.64 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Misapplication of Powerex Corp. v. Reliant 
Energy Services, Inc. to the Remand Order in HIF Bio 
According to the Court‘s most recent guidance in Powerex Corp. v. Re-
liant Energy Services, Inc., an appellate court should determine if a remand 
order is based on a jurisdictional defect and therefore immune from appel-
late review by first examining the remand order itself to determine if the 
district court characterized the remand as subject-matter jurisdictional.65  
For example, the Powerex Court concluded that the district court in that 
case purported to remand on the ground that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction because (1) the heading of the remand order‘s ―discussion section‖ 
was ―entitled ‗Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Removed Actions,‘‖ (2) 
―the District Court explicitly stated that the remand ‗issue hinge[d] . . . on 
the Court‘s jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims,‘‖ and (3) in 
its order denying a stay of the remand, the district court ―repeatedly stated 
that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to § 
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Unlike the Powerex Court, the HIF Bio court did not carefully examine 
the remand order to determine if the district court actually characterized the 
remand as subject-matter jurisdictional.  The Federal Circuit simply stated 
that the district court remanded the state claims ―based on declining sup-
plemental jurisdiction.‖67  Review of the remand order in HIF Bio, however, 
reveals that in contrast to the district court in Powerex, the district court in 
HIF Bio did not characterize the remand as one that was based on a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Instead, the district court made it clear that it 
was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the state claims 
predominated over the RICO claim and therefore state court was the proper 
forum in which to litigate them.68 
According to Powerex, once an appellate court concludes that a district 
court characterized a remand as subject-matter jurisdictional, then the ap-
pellate court is permitted to ―look behind‖ the remand order to determine if 
that characterization is colorable.69  If the characterization is colorable, then 
appellate review is barred.  Because the district court in HIF Bio did not 
characterize the remand in that case as subject-matter jurisdictional, the 
Federal Circuit should not have ―looked behind‖ the remand order to de-
termine whether Cohill remands are based on a defect in subject matter ju-
risdiction.  Instead, the court should have concluded that the remand did not 
fall within § 1447(c) and that the review bar of § 1447(d) therefore did not 
apply.  At that point, the court should have turned to the merits of the ap-
peal. 
If the district court in HIF Bio had actually characterized the remand of 
the state claims under § 1367(c) as subject-matter jurisdictional, however, 
then it would have been appropriate for the Federal Circuit to proceed to the 
question of whether such a characterization is colorable.  In Powerex, it was 
debatable whether there was actually a defect in subject matter jurisdiction 
that required remand, but that was enough for the Court to conclude that the 
district court‘s characterization of its remand as subject-matter jurisdictional 
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trict court were to characterize or attempt to characterize a Cohill remand as 
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that characterization would 
not be colorable because, although the Supreme Court has not yet decided 
whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional, the issue is not 
debatable.   
The HIF Bio court concluded that Cohill remands are based on a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction because supplemental claims do not have an 
independent basis of jurisdiction.  Therefore, once a district court declines 
to hear the claims they lose their jurisdictional basis under § 1367(a) and 
must be remanded.  In addition, the court distinguished Cohill remands 
from abstention-based remands on the ground that federal courts only ab-
stain from hearing claims with an independent basis of jurisdiction and 
therefore abstention-based remands cannot be colorably characterized as 
subject-matter jurisdictional. 
The HIF Bio court is correct, of course, that supplemental claims by 
definition do not have an independent basis of jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
assuming that the Federal Circuit is correct that courts abstain only from 
deciding claims with an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
court has undoubtedly identified a real distinction between the two doc-
trines.  This distinction, however, is immaterial.  The crucial distinction is 
between the existence of judicial power and the exercise of that power. 
As explained above, both the language of the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute and Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that the decision whether 
to exercise supplemental power that exists under § 1367(a) is discretionary 
once § 1367(c) is satisfied.  And if a court declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction and remands the claims, the remand is based on the court‘s use 
of its discretion and not a jurisdictional defect.  Jurisdiction does not evapo-
rate the moment a court decides not to exercise its supplemental jurisdic-
tion.  Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold 
that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review the Cohill remand in HIF 
Bio.  More broadly, the Court should hold that any characterization of Co-
hill remands as based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 
1447(c) is not colorable, and therefore Cohill remands are reviewable on 
appeal under the Court‘s current interpretation of §§ 1447(c) and (d). 
IV. SHOULD COHILL REMANDS BE SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW? 
To conclude that Cohill remands are reviewable on appeal does not an-
swer the question of whether Cohill remands should be reviewable on ap-
peal.  According to the Supreme Court, the goal of § 1447(d) is to avoid 
litigation about which of two competent court systems will try remanded 
claims.  Thus, the conclusion that Cohill remands are unreviewable would 
serve the purpose of § 1447(d) in any case where there is no question about 
whether a state court is competent to try the remanded claims.   
Assuming that the goal of decreasing litigation over ―nonmerits‖ issues 
is worthwhile, the question becomes how best to achieve it.  One option is 
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for the Court and Congress to maintain the status quo.  As things stand now, 
the Court has insisted that §§ 1447(c) and (d) must be read together and 
Congress has not indicated that it disapproves of that interpretation.  If 
Thermtron and its progeny (from both the Supreme Court and the lower 
courts) are any indication, however, the status quo has not accomplished the 
goal of limiting ―nonmerits‖ litigation.   
A second option is for the Court to read § 1447(d) as it was written and 
allow appellate review of remands only in civil rights cases or in other cases 
where Congress has specifically provided for review.  This approach would 
reduce litigation, but of course Thermtron and its progeny stand squarely in 
the way of this option.  A third option is for Congress to re-draft § 1447(d) 
and clarify the types of remands that fall within the appellate review bar.  
The problem with this option, however, is that the re-drafting of statutes of-
ten leads to litigation, and even the relatively clear language of the current 
version of § 1447(d) did not prevent the Court from interpreting it contrary 
to its plain language.  
A fourth option is for Congress to repeal § 1447(d) and permit appel-
late review of remand orders without restriction.  This approach obviously 
would generate litigation, but it would also end litigation over whether a 
particular remand order falls within §§ 1447(c) and (d).  The resources that 
litigants and the courts now expend on litigating whether a remand order is 
reviewable could be spent on litigating the merits of the remand.  This ap-
proach would also end the anomalies created by the Court‘s current ap-
proach, such as permitting the review of discretionary remands but banning 
the review of jurisdictional remands.  In addition, regardless of whether a 
claim was dismissed or remanded, the availability of appeal and the level of 
review would be the same for all litigants.  Thus, although the repeal of § 
1447(d) might result in a net increase in litigation, it could also result in a 
better use of judicial and litigant resources and promote fairness.  As a mat-
ter of policy, therefore, all remand orders should be subject to appellate re-
view. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court wants to avoid litigation about which of two 
competent court systems will try supplemental claims, it may be tempted to 
find that Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and therefore cannot be reviewed on appeal.  The Court should resist that 
temptation, however, because the plain language of § 1367, the distinction 
between the existence of judicial power and its discretionary exercise, and 
the proper application of Powerex to the remand order in HIF Bio all dem-
onstrate that the Federal Circuit incorrectly concluded that Cohill remands 
are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d).  Thus, 
the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that Cohill 
remands are reviewable on appeal. 
